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In her ambitious paper, which comes on the heels of her book Plato’s Socrates as Narrator: 
A Philosophical Muse (2013), Anne-Marie Schultz claims to have opened up a new avenue in 
Platonic studies.  By drawing attention to the various self-narratives that Plato put in the 
mouth of Socrates, she points to a feature of the dialogues that previous scholars, so she 
contends, had missed: “Aside from my own work,” she asserts, “the narrative dimensions of 
Socrates’ philosophy are overlooked in the secondary literature” (p.2).  Such neglect is all the 
more regrettable, she continues, in that Socrates’ self-narratives have particular significance 
for us, contemporary educators, in so far as they stand “to shape the philosophical stories that 
we tell our students” and thereby help us to “create the philosophers of the future.”     
 The Socrates that comes to life in Schultz’s paper is an avuncular and guileless 
mentor, whose self-awareness and readiness to express his emotions have rendered 
“profoundly sensitive” to the emotional states of his interlocutors.  The emphasis that she 
places on the softer sides of the personality of the Platonic Socrates is dictated by her 
strategic aim of presenting a Socrates for our educationally troubled times, a Socrates who 
lives his philosophy and for whom “the practice of philosophy is a means by which [we] can 
support each other” (p. 20).   
                                           
1 This is a response to the original form of the paper that Dr Schultz read at Boston College in March 2014.  
A revised version of the paper did not reach me before the deadline I was given for submission to the editors.   
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To grasp the full impact of Schultz’s Socrates, we have to contrast him with the other 
Socrates, the Socrates of academic tradition, whom our students encounter when embarking 
on the study of philosophy.  That Socrates is a master of argument, a gadfly, a torpedo fish 
and, at times, a manipulating bully, who makes use of the elenchos to reduce his interlocutors 
to a state of aporia, and whose perverse philosophical views include the denial of akrasia.  
Schultz, it may be taken for granted, does not deny the existence of that other Socrates, 
whether he be conceived as a philosopher in his own right2 or as Plato’s mouthpiece3 or as an 
amalgam of the two.4  Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that she would deny the 
validity of the labours that philologists and philosophers over the ages have expended on the 
text of the dialogues.  What she denies is that the Socrates of our austere academic tradition is 
the only persona of the Socrates of the dialogues, or even the most appropriate one to present 
to our students.  Her Socrates leads “a self-reflective philosophical life,” in which “emotions 
play an important part’ (p. 2).  He is a mentor who “underscores the affective dimensions of 
the learning process” (p.15) and who does not hesitate to “hold his own life up for analysis” 
(p. 17) so as to prepare his friends and pupils “to do philosophy without him.” (17)  In short, 
he “‘practices philosophy as care for self and care for others’” (p.1)  Such aspects of the 
philosophical personality of Socrates can be seen to best advantage, Schultz argues, in the 
Socratic self-narratives that Plato has included in the Symposium, the Apology and the 
Phaedo.5   
As soon becomes apparent upon reading her text, Schultz’s current work builds on a 
thesis made famous, in their different ways, by Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, namely 
that in Classical and post-Classical antiquity philosophy was a way of life in the sense of 
serving a practical and soteriological function.  In his influential What is Ancient 
                                           
2 As, e.g., Vlastos (1971) and Brickhouse and Smith (1994) maintain. 
3 As, e.g., Kahn (1996) maintains. 
4 As, e.g., Rowe (2007) maintains. 
5 I here reproduce the order in which Anne-Marie Schultz lists the three dialogues.   
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Philosophy?6 Hadot argued that the various philosophical schools of the ancient world are 
best seen as offering, not only abstract cosmological speculations and metaphysical theories, 
but also - and perhaps chiefly - systems of values destined to help their adherents and 
followers to understand where their true good lay and to live their life accordingly.  To 
support them in what was nothing short of a transformation of the self, these schools devised 
various spiritual exercises and practices.  As is now widely recognised, Hadot’s influence 
was instrumental in causing Michel Foucault in the last ten years of his life to embark on an 
in-depth study of ancient thought.7  His protracted reflections on the personality of the 
Platonic Socrates,8 which form the bulk of his last set of lectures at the Collège de France 
(1984), are for the most part focused on Socrates’ use of the elenchos and his reflections on 
death in the Phaedo.  The Platonic Socrates’ thinking on death and the soul, Foucault argued, 
led him to defend a conception of philosophy as care of the self - one’s own self mainly, but 
also that of one’s interlocutors, friends and fellow citizens.  Foucault’s presentation of the 
Platonic Socrates’ interest in philosophy as a practice is particularly relevant to the topic of 
Schultz’s paper.   
However, if it is clear that Schultz has been influenced, whether directly or indirectly, by 
these two thinkers, she is far from being a mere disciple.  She brings her own preoccupations 
to the study of the Platonic Socrates.  While Hadot and Foucault both see Socrates as an 
apostle of reason, of logos,9 she introduces a coda to their common thesis by bringing in the 
perspective of a contemporary educator who takes emotional self-awareness to be part and 
parcel of self-care and, as such, central to the philosophic life.  Rather than dealing with those 
aspects of Schulz’s work that are shared with Hadot’s and Foucault’s, I shall henceforth 
direct my response to claims that are her own.  More specifically, I shall address what is in 
my view the main controversial point in her paper by asking whether her emotive and 
avuncular Socrates is to be found in the dialogues that she has chosen for analysis.  As a 
challenger of exegetical orthodoxy, the onus is on her to show that the two Socrates - hers 
and that of various academic traditions - can cohabit in the text of Plato, and hence that her 
approach usefully complements the existing ones.  I shall first concentrate on the 
                                           
6 Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? 1995, trans. M. Chase (2002).    
7 For a detailed and enlightening study of Hadot’s and Foucault’s respective Socrates, see Alexander Nehamas 
(1998), chapter 6.     
8 See his last set of lectures at the Collège de France, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres (1982-1983), trans. 
into English by G. Burchell as The Courage of Truth (2011). See also vols 2 and 3 of L’Histoire de la Sexualité, 
L'usage des plaisirs (1984) and Le souci de soi (1984), trans. into English by R. Hurley respectively as The Use 
of Pleasure and The Care of the Self  (1990 and 1986).  
9 For Hadot (2002), see, e.g., p.32; for Foucault (2011), see, e.g. pp. 100-101.  
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autobiographical narrative in the Phaedo before offering some brief and seemingly 
rudimentary remarks on the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima in the Symposium. 
       
1. Socrates’ autobiographical narrative in the Phaedo 
 
It was a shrewd move on Schultz’s part to pick the self-narrative of the Phaedo as a passage 
likely to support her thesis.  Because it is relatively free of irony – “relatively free” does not 
mean “entirely devoid of it” – this particular self-narrative is one of the few passages in the 
corpus where the Platonic Socrates can reasonably be assumed to mean pretty much what he 
says. 
The passage has considerable historical and literary value.  Insofar as Socrates’ rejection 
of the Anaxagorean concept of nous marks a break with what we now call Presocratic 
enquiries into nature, it is one the most significant in the history of western philosophy.  
Insofar as it features a kind of discourse never attempted before, namely an autobiographical 
narrative in which a philosopher gives a detailed account of the stages of the intellectual 
journey that led him all the way to his final, albeit as yet tentative, conclusions, the passage 
has considerable literary value.  Admittedly, Hesiod in the proem to the Theogony had 
explained how the Muses had made him a poet, and, a couple of centuries later, Parmenides 
had recounted how wise mares and young maidens had borne him to the house of a goddess 
who would teach him “the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth.”10  But however 
sophisticated Hesiod’s proem proves to be on close analysis, and no matter how evocative 
Parmenides’ opening lines continue to be, Socrates’ self-narrative in the Phaedo is in a 
different league.  Only Descartes’ Discourse on Method can arguably rival it for contrived 
philosophical candour and literary merit.  
Consider if you would the giant steps forward achieved by the Socratic narrator in the 
Phaedo: after his youthful enthusiasm for natural science (peri physeōs historian, 96a7) had 
waned, he had come to realise that the naturalistic causes propounded by his predecessors 
could not, on their own, fully account for the phenomena of coming-to-be and perishing.  
This led him to seek another kind of causes, causes which would possess a “good binding 
force which literally binds things together and holds them fast” (99c5-6), that is, causes that 
would be self-sufficient as causes and separate (chōrista) from the phenomena to be 
                                           
10 For a comparison between the two autobiographical sketches, see Stern-Gillet (2014). 
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explained.  He then evolved a conception of the soul as principle of organisation of both 
individual living things and the universe as a whole, a conception that would later be 
developed and refined in the Phaedrus (where the soul is defined as a self-moving entity) and 
the Timaeus (where it is presented as the origin and the source of excellence of all bodily 
nature).  And, as if this was not enough, he had opened up an inquiry into the nature of 
causality and the difference between causes and conditions, thereby identifying an avenue of 
reflection that would continue to this day.  Because these issues are so philosophically and 
historically weighty, the self-narrative in which he recalls the stages of his philosophical life 
has been the object of minute scrutiny on the part of the most astute scholars and 
philosophers of their time.  Yet, mirabile dictu, those aspects of the passage that are of 
particular interest to Anne-Marie Schultz have mostly been ignored or by-passed.  This may 
possibly be due to the long scholarly neglect of the literary aspects of the dialogues.  After 
all, it was not so long ago that Gregory Vlastos delivered himself of the opinion that Plato 
liked to cover “the bones and sinews of arguments” with “a skin of graceful chatter and 
badinage.”11  Fortunately, that view is no longer widely shared and what Vlastos called 
“badinage” is now mostly recognised to be a source of useful insights into Plato’s 
philosophy.   
Is so much true of this particular self-narrative?  Has it got more to yield than a highly 
complex set of arguments expressed in glorious prose?  Schultz has mounted a passionate 
plea to show that it has.  She claims that it is the manner in which Socrates is made to recount 
the search that led him to undertake a deuteros plous (second sailing), rather than the reasons 
for undertaking it, that has educational as well as philosophical relevance for us today.  The 
features of the passage that make it particularly worth studying at the present time are the 
emotions that Socrates is made freely to express in it and the pedagogical skill with which he 
adapts his autobiographical narrative to the needs of his audience of grieving friends and 
associates.   
Schultz emphasises what she would have us see as the emotional content of the passage 
on no fewer than four occasions; Socrates, she writes, “characterizes his thought process in 
highly emotional terms” (14), he “underscores the affective dimensions of the learning 
process” (15) and he “eloquently describes his emotional state” when he reports fearing the 
blinding of his soul as he tries to look “at things with his eyes.” (16)  The lines she quotes in 
support of this last point are those in which Socrates explains that, as he was growing 
                                           
11 TLS, 24th February 1978, quoted by I. Richardson (1995: 82, n. 34). 
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disenchanted with the naturalistic explanations of the physikoi, he decided to embark on ‘a 
second sailing’ and to turn instead to logoi (arguments, propositions, reasons) in the hope of 
finding an explanation as to why things are the best way for them to be: 
 Ἔδ ο ξ ε  τ ο ί ν υ ν  μ ο ι , ἦ  δ ᾽  ὅ ς , μ ε τ ὰ  τ α ῦ τ α , 
ἐ πε ι δ ὴ  ἀ πε ι ρ ή κ η  τ ὰ  ὄ ν τ α  σ κ ο πῶ ν , δ ε ῖ ν  
ε ὐ λ α β η θ ῆ ν α ι  μ ὴ  πά θ ο ι μ ι  ὅ πε ρ  ο ἱ  τ ὸ ν  
ἥ λ ι ο ν  ἐ κ λ ε ί πο ν τ α  θ ε ω ρ ο ῦ ν τ ε ς  κ α ὶ  
σ κ ο πο ύ μ ε ν ο ι  πά σ χ ο υ σ ι ν · δ ι α φ θ ε ί ρ ο ν τ α ι  
γ ά ρ  πο υ  ἔ ν ι ο ι  τ ὰ  ὄ μ μ α τ α , ἐ ὰ ν  μ ὴ  ἐ ν  ὕ δ α τ ι  
ἤ  99.e τ ι ν ι  τ ο ι ο ύ τ ῳ  σ κ ο πῶ ν τ α ι  τ ὴ ν  ε ἰ κ ό ν α  
α ὐ τ ο ῦ . τ ο ι ο ῦ τ ό ν  τ ι  κ α ὶ  ἐ γ ὼ  δ ι ε ν ο ή θ η ν , 
κ α ὶ  ἔ δ ε ι σ α  μ ὴ  πα ν τ ά πα σ ι  τ ὴ ν  ψ υ χ ὴ ν  
τ υ φ λ ω θ ε ί η ν  β λ έ πω ν  πρ ὸ ς  τ ὰ  πρ ά γ μ α τ α  τ ο ῖ ς  
ὄ μ μ α σ ι  κ α ὶ  ἑ κ ά σ τ ῃ  τ ῶ ν  α ἰ σ θ ή σ ε ω ν  
ἐ πι χ ε ι ρ ῶ ν  ἅ πτ ε σ θ α ι  α ὐ τ ῶ ν . ἔ δ ο ξ ε  δ ή  μ ο ι  
χ ρ ῆ ν α ι  ε ἰ ς  τ ο ὺ ς  λ ό γ ο υ ς  κ α τ α φ υ γ ό ν τ α  ἐ ν  
ἐ κ ε ί ν ο ι ς  σ κ ο πε ῖ ν  τ ῶ ν  ὄ ν τ ω ν  τ ὴ ν  
ἀ λ ή θ ε ι α ν . 
Well, at that point, when I had wearied of my investigations, I felt that I must be 
careful not to meet the fate which befalls those who observe and investigate an 
eclipse of the sun; sometimes, I believe, they ruin their eyesight, unless they look at 
its image in water or some other medium, I had the same sort of idea: I was afraid I 
might be completely blinded in my mind if I looked at things with my eyes and 
attempted to apprehend them with one or other of my senses; so I decided I must 
take refuge in propositions which I judge to be the soundest, and I put down as true 
whatever seems to me to be in agreement with this.12   
      My reading of these powerful lines is somewhat different from that of Schultz; lots of 
philosophy and a modicum of emotion is what I find in them.  For the reasons just outlined, I 
would describe Socrates’ account of his search for teleological causes as well-paced and 
lively, humorous in places, faintly self-deprecatory in others and generally well-judged to 
hold his auditors’ attention.  The vocabulary is somewhat recherché perhaps, but the verbs of 
                                           
12 Phaedo, 99d4-e6; all quotations from the Phaedo are in Hackforth’ translation, with occasional modifications, 
always flagged as such.   
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mindfulness (eulabeomai, dianoeomai) are not especially self-revelatory or emotional in their 
connotations.  As for paschō, it here bears its prime meaning of ‘to have something done to 
one’, which in translators’ English becomes ‘to suffer’ and in common English ‘to 
undergo.’13  The lines refer back to characteristically self-deprecatory statements made 
earlier: in 96c1, Socrates says that by nature he is no ‘great shakes’ (aphuēs … ouden 
chrēma) at the kind of investigation (skepsis) that seeks to explain natural phenomena by 
other natural phenomena, and in 97b6 he explains that he had come to abandon that particular 
method in favour of what he calls ‘a confused jumble of my own’ (autos eikē𝑖 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑟ō).  
    More generally, the Phaedo as a whole appears to me to be conspicuous for the subdued 
and restrained manner in which emotion is expressed in it.  Let me take a few examples: in 
60a, Socrates has a lamenting Xanthippe and the baby taken home, presumably for fear that 
they would stand in the way of calm and composed philosophical exchanges. A similar point 
is made at the close of the dialogue, when Socrates urges his friends to compose themselves 
and avoid unseemly behaviour; the use of plēmmeleō, whose first meaning is to make a false 
note in music (117d7-e1), suggests that a public display of emotion would strike him as 
aesthetically unpleasing and therefore undesirable.  In what is possibly the most poignant 
passage of the dialogue Socrates strokes Phaedo’s hair and anticipates that it would be cut the 
following day as a sign of mourning.  If, as I readily concede, there is more than a touch of 
melancholy in Socrates’ remark, it is directed at Phaedo’s future sorrow, not at his own 
impending demise.  Indeed Socrates himself remains strikingly serene throughout the whole 
exchange.  Most significant of all in that respect is his remark that if, unlike him, one could 
not be sure that the soul is immortal it would be rational to fear death (cf. phobeisthai … ei 
mē anoētos eiē, 95d6-e1).14  The same point is made at the conclusion of the eschatological 
myth (114d4), where Socrates reiterates that since he holds the soul to be deathless 
(athanatos) as well as indestructible (anōlethros),15 he has no reason to fear death and every 
reason to attend (epimeleias dē deitai) to his soul, “not only in respect of this present period 
which we call our lifetime, but in respect of all time”.16   More generally, within the context 
of the dialogue, Socrates’ remarkable emotional restraint is presented as stemming from his 
conviction that the body is to be held in check if it is not “to confuse, disturb and alarm us, 
thereby preventing our soul from seeing the truth” (66d5-7).  As he is made to point out: 
                                           
13 LSJ, s.v. 1.  In the self-narrative likewise pathos has the meaning of experience, e.g., Phaedo 96a2  
14This refers back to ibid., 63b-c. 
15 Ibid., 105e10 and 107a1 respectively. 
16 Ibid., 107c2-4.  Incidentally, this is the only occurrence of epimeleia in the whole of the dialogue. 
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… the body fills us with desires and longings and fears and imaginations of all 
sorts, and such quantities of trash (phluaria), that as the common saying puts it, 
we really never have a moment to think about anything because of the body. 
(66c2-6) 
In the Phaedo, as can be seen, the negative theorization of the body practically rules out that 
any positive role be ascribed to the emotions in the philosophic life.  So much is borne out in 
the valedictory speech that Socrates addresses to his disciples.   
   You may think that I am labouring the point - perhaps I am.  But if I am, it is as a 
preliminary step to arguing that Socrates’ composure in the face of death, his refusal to allow 
a display of emotion to intrude into the proceedings at any time, come as a direct result of the 
philosophical insights and arguments recalled in the self-narrative.  One of the lessons of the 
complex autobiographical narrative that Plato put in the mouth of Socrates is to suggest that 
ontology and ethics are not separate undertakings.  Reason, when properly used, shows us 
that the ultimate causes of all there is, including the sublunary world and its contents, should 
guide the way in which we live our life.  Admittedly, this particular point is not explicitly 
stated in the Phaedo, but the seeds of Socratic intellectualism and what contemporary 
philosophers call moral realism are sown there, only to be nurtured and fully articulated in 
later dialogues.  Suffice it to say for now that, paradoxical though it may seem, the serenity 
that the Platonic Socrates displays in the face of death ultimately comes as a result of his 
break with the pre-Platonic philosophical past, a break that took him from one mode of 
investigation (skepsis) to another, from a physicalist conception of nous as principle of order 
and cause of all things (97c2) to a radically different conception of causation, according to  
which causes properly so-called do account for the optimal being or state of their effects.  
Conceived as Socrates came to conceive them, such causes are both the ultimate grounds of 
value and the normative objects of human aspiration.  Socrates’ intellectualism, I conclude, is 
best understood in the light of the teleological conception of causality that he came to 
formulate as a result of undertaking ‘a second sailing’. Platonic causes, therefore, should 
ideally have a direct bearing on our conduct; to care for the self is ultimately to turn away 
from the phluaria generated by the body and to orient the soul to what it is most akin, namely 
the deathless and the indestructible.    
 If I have argued that the self-narrative of the Phaedo is tied to a singular moment in 
the history of western philosophy, it does not mean that I would deny its pedagogical value 
for today’s readers.  Far from it, for I do agree with Anne-Marie Schultz that the passage does 
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have such a value.  However, rather than seeing it as she does, namely as a model of 
‘therapeutic self-care’, I read it as a paradigm of philosophical enquiry.  Although it is the 
story of one man’s particular experience (cf. pathē) at a particular juncture in the history of 
philosophy, the autobiographical narrative of the Phaedo gives a vivid account of the way in 
which the philosophical mind, as embodied in the person of Socrates, typically works as he 
goes through the stages of his inquiries.  The stages are all there: Socrates’ hopes and 
assumptions as he begins to think of the problem, the first difficulties he encounters and how 
he attempts to overcome them, his false starts, his hesitations in starting afresh before coming 
to formulate a hypothesis likely to yield a tentative solution, and finally, how the various 
implications of the tentative solution would still have to be tested for consistency and truth.  
Having recounted the reasons for his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras’ concept of causation, 
Socrates turns to the steps that he took before he could address the problem anew.  He first 
unlearned what he thought he knew, questioned what he had so far taken to be so obvious as 
to be beyond question, and recognised his general ignorance in matters of causation.  He had 
to come to terms with a state of aporia not dissimilar to the kind he had so often in the past 
induced in his interlocutors (96c-97a).17  Finally, in order to overcome the intellectual 
confusion generated by the process of unlearning, he came to realise that he had to approach 
the problem from a radically different angle.  He posited (cf. hypothemenos, 100b5-6) the 
existence of the Beautiful in itself (auto kath’ hauto, 100b6), the Good in itself and all the 
other Forms and considered this to be the safest (asphalestaton) answer that he could provide 
to the question as to why things bear the properties that they do.   
   Therein, in my view, lies the pedagogical value that Plato ascribed to the self-narrative that 
he put in Socrates’ mouth.  Not only did he make Socrates impress upon Cebes the principle 
of intellectual hygiene that requires that hypotheses and their consequences should be 
discussed separately (101d), but he also had Socrates calmly tell Cebes and Simmias that his 
experiences (pathē) would be of some use to them in later life, at such a time as they would 
be able to conduct their own inquiries.  For all these reasons, Socrates’ self-narrative in the 
Phaedo also came to be Socrates’ last tutorial, in the course of which, through his exemplary 
serenity and self-control, he taught the assembled disciples how to use their reason and 
critical faculties in order to address, not only metaphysical and epistemological issues, but 
also problems of value concerning human life and death.    
                                           
17 Although such self-induced state of aporia was “not dissimilar” to that which he had induced in others in the 
past it was not, even so, exactly the same in so far as no elenchos was involved.  It may be because self-
refutation would be a paradoxical relation that Plato used the word skepsis. 
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2. Socrates’ conversation with Diotima 
 
In his Symposium Plato would spell out what he had only hinted at in the Phaedo.  He would 
articulate the way in which the ultimate structure of reality bears directly on questions of 
value, particularly those concerning the nature of the best life for a human being to lead.  To 
reach out to the highest cognitive object, to behold the Form of Beauty, he had the Mantinean 
priestess teach Socrates, nothing less than a re-orientation of desire (erōs)18 is required.  But 
if Plato’s message is clear, the way in which he conveyed it is highly complex, so complex 
that few texts in the corpus raise as many problems as does the speech ascribed to Diotima, 
the priestess in question.  Is she a fictional character and, if so, does she speak for Socrates or 
for Plato or, possibly, for both?  Is Socrates’ so-called ‘account’ of their conversation 
enlivened by touches of his mysterious irony and, if so, what form do they take and what 
bearing do they have on the content of the exchange?  Is the portrait of Socrates that emerges 
from his ‘instruction’ at the hands of the priestess consistent with the one drawn by 
Alcibiades at the end of the dialogue?  Lastly, to what extent can either speech, or possibly 
both, confidently be assumed to be true to the historical Socrates?   
 Perhaps wisely, Schulz does not bother with any of these questions.  Her sole concern 
is with the persona of Socrates as it emerges from his exchange with the priestess, a persona 
that she regards as mostly concerned with emphasizing “the value of the practice of 
philosophy as a therapeutic mode of self-care” (p. 3).  Schultz contends further that, like the 
figure whose death is narrated in the Phaedo, the self-professed pupil of Diotima takes 
emotion to play a crucial role in “the self-reflective philosophical life” (p.3) and that he sees 
no reason, therefore, to hide the emotions that the priestess’ speech has elicited in him.  
Combined, the two claims warrant the inference that Schultz believes that emotion has a 
significant place in all aspects of the philosophic life and that the manner in which Plato 
describes the interaction between Socrates and Diotima shows that such was his view also.   
 To test the validity of Schultz’ thesis, I shall begin by looking at the textual evidence 
that she quotes to substantiate it.  Her first move is to draw attention to Socrates’ reactions to 
the priestess when she asks him “What does love actually do? Can you tell me?” (206b3-4).  
Rather than immediately addressing these questions, Socrates, so Schultz claims, declares 
                                           
18 As the word is defined by Diotima in Symp. 202b-203a.   
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himself to be “impressed by your [Diotima’s] knowledge (206b5-6),” to find “what she 
[Diotima] had said surprising” (208b7), and to have a great “eagerness to learn” from her, so 
baffled has he been made to be by her claims (“I don’t understand what you mean ... I need a 
diviner to interpret it for me” (206b9-10, p. 5). 
 Let it be noted, firstly, that the ‘emotions’ that Anne-Marie Schultz lists in support of 
her thesis, namely admiration, bafflement and eagerness to learn, can aptly be described as 
intellectual reactions to the content of Diotima’s speech.  Rather than turbulences of the 
thumos, they are expressions of philosophical puzzlement which, as such, are likely to act as 
spurs for further reflection.19  Let it be noted, secondly, that a question mark hovers the 
genuineness or sincerity of Socrates’ expression of admiration, bafflement and eagerness to 
learn.  Given the persona he is given in the dialogues of definition, all of which almost 
certainly pre-date the Symposium, the possibility must be envisaged that in the latter dialogue, 
too, he is only pretending to be baffled, awed and eager to learn.  
 The possibility becomes a virtual certainty when we turn to the text of the dialogues 
in question.  Consider the lines in which he replies to Diotima’s question as to whether he 
knows what the function of Love is: “Of course not, Diotima ... If I could [tell you what Love 
does], I wouldn’t be so impressed by your knowledge.  This is exactly what I come to you to 
learn about.”20  These lines cannot but resonate with readers familiar with the dialogues of 
definition, in which verbs expressing bafflement, such as thaumazein (to marvel at), are often 
closely followed by expressions denoting eagerness to learn (manthanein).  When the speaker 
is Socrates, the bafflement and eagerness to learn from a self-professed expert cannot be 
taken at face value since the context invariably makes clear that the ‘expert’ in question is in 
reality no expert and that Socrates is about to subject him to an elenchos.    
   The clearest example of this typical Socratic move is in the Euthyphro. Socrates, who is 
about to stand trial on a charge of impiety, tells Euthyphro, who claims expertise in religious 
matters, that he hopes to learn from him the nature of piety: “... the best thing for me, my 
admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on” 
                                           
19 A Bertrand Russell would famously note some twenty-four centuries later (1905): “... it is a wholesome plan, 
in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same 
purpose as is served by experiments in physical science.”  
20 Οὐ μεντἂν σέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτίμα, ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα 
μαθησόμενος, Symposium, 206b5-6.  All quotations from the Symposium are in R. Waterfield’s 
translation.   
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(trans. H.N. Fowler).21  In the Lesser Hippias, in the course of a conversation with the 
Sophist from Elis, who is portrayed as a bumptious know-all, Socrates describes his own 
attitude to learning: “I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation; for I am 
not afraid to ask, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers” 
(trans. H.N. Fowler).22  Lastly and most relevantly, a similar reaction is to be observed earlier 
on in our dialogue, at a point when Socrates claims to have been reduced to a state of aporia 
by the brilliance of Agathon’s speech, which, so he claims, has made him realize how foolish 
had been his earlier claim of expertise in ta erōtika.23        
 In none of these cases does Socrates genuinely feel the amazement, admiration and 
humility that he claims to feel.  So much is clear from the context, which has Socrates’ 
interlocutors, Euthyphro and Hippias, come across as insufferably conceited.  As for 
Socrates’ admiration for Agathon’s speech, it, too, cannot but be sham; if he had genuinely 
admired the young playwright’s eulogy of Erōs, he would not have expressed his admiration 
by parodying his style and later labelling it Gorgianic.24  Would Schultz wish to deny that in 
those passages Socrates is deliberately saying one thing while meaning the opposite, and 
making sure that the victim is the only one to be taken in by his words of praise?   
 If Socrates’ praise in the above cases is sham, is there any reason to suppose that the 
almost identical words of admiration that he addresses to Diotima are genuinely and fully 
meant?  ‘Up to a point only’, would be my answer.  To be sure, there is one signal difference 
between Euthyphro, Hippias and Agathon on the one hand and Diotima on the other: while 
all three men come across as foolish in their self-confidence Diotima, who is given the 
honour of introducing the Forms, remains a figure of authority throughout her long speech.   
 This said, there are, even so, signs that Socrates, although impressed by the priestess’ 
speech, deliberately maintains a distance in relation to her extraordinary claims and that his 
eager embrace of the pupil’s position is a trifle forced.  We may even speculate that the touch 
of scepticism that can be detected in Socrates’ account of the conversation reflects Plato’s 
own reluctance to express wholehearted commitment to the theory he has Diotima expound.  
                                           
21 Ἆρ᾽ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς 
πρὸς Μέλητον, Euthyphro, 5a3-4. 
22 δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὅ με σῴζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ 
ἐρωτῶ καὶ χάριν πολλὴν ἔχω τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, Hippias Minor, 372c2-5.  See also Laches, 181d2-4 
and Gorgias, 489d7-8. 
23 Symposium, 177d7-8. 
24 As noted by Bury in an ad loc. comment to ibid., 198a6-7.  Socrates’ description of Agathon’s speech as 
Gorgianic is at 198c1-2.  The extravagant compliments that Socrates pays Agathon in the opening scene of the 
dialogue (175d-e) are equally insincere.    
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What, at any rate, is certain is that Socrates, in his customary amused and detached way, 
makes it clear how much Diotima’s manner of exposition and style of delivery are not to his 
taste.  Her speech, as he reproduces it, consists of a very long monologue; as such, it is an 
example of the makrologia characteristic of the Sophists, which he is famously made to 
castigate in the Protagoras.25  Her manner is dogmatic and hyper-didactic; her self-
confidence verges on arrogance; she instructs rather than teach, and she deals brusquely, if 
not scornfully, with her interlocutor of the moment who, one would have thought, least 
deserves her scorn.  No wonder that Socrates likens her to “a true sophist” (208c1), throwing 
back at her the very word that she had used earlier to describe Erōs (203b8).   
 Lastly and most relevantly to the present context, the attitude of amused detachment 
that Socrates maintains throughout Diotima’s speech is all of a piece with the personality that 
Alcibiades’ eulogizes at the end of the dialogue.  Alcibiades’ Socrates is a model of self-
possession: not only is he able to resist the charms of the handsomest young man in Athens 
and to remain sober in the midst of drunken revellers, but his debating skills unfailingly 
enable him to gain the upper hand in discussions.  In fact, such is the deftness of his 
arguments (logoi, 215d3-4) and the soundness of his judgments that Alcibiades cannot 
conceive that anyone else of such intelligence (phronēsis) and commitment to truth could 
ever have existed.  As for Socrates’ physical endurance, it is as exceptional as his mental 
agility: he withstood the cold of Potidea and he can go without sustenance while silently 
working out philosophical problems.  In short, so Alcibiades is made to conclude, Socrates 
can be likened to those crudely carved effigies of the satyr Silenus that are offered for sale at 
street corners, poised for merry singing on the outside, but containing effigies of the gods 
inside.  This, Alcibiades explains, is what Socrates is like: the front he puts to the outside 
world is unlike what he is inside, namely “full to the brim of moderation (posēs ... 
sōphrosunēs, 216d7 and 219d5) and steadfastness” (cf. karteros, 220c2).  
 There could not be for Plato a more effective way than Alcibiades’ eulogy of 
conveying Socrates’ self-possession, indomitability, rationality and commitment to truth.  
Alcibiades’ Socrates is the very same character who, in the Phaedo, had presented misology, 
the distrust of reasonable discourse,26 as the ultimate sin that would-be philosophers should 
guard against.  To trust reason had been the ultimate advice he gave to his friends and 
associates.  As Phaedo reports him as saying: let us “courageously exert ourselves to become 
                                           
25 Protagoras, 334c-335c. 
26 Phaedo, 89d sqq.  For an interesting commentary on this and related passages in the Crito, see Foucault 
(2011; 107-08) 
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sound (hugiōs echein), you, Phaedo, and you others out of regard for your remaining lifetime, 
I out of regard for death itself.”27   
 To argue that the Platonic Socrates takes emotions to play an important role in the 
‘self-reflective philosophical life’ is to run the risk of mistaking the outer casing of the 
personality of Socrates for his inner self.   
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